The use of strategic metaphors in intercultural business communication by Cacciaguidi-Fahy, Sophie & Cunningham, James
The Use of Strategic Metaphors in Intercultural
Business Communication
Sophie Cacciaguidi-Fahy
James Cunningham
This paper contends that the use of strategic metaphors can help deliver
the eﬀective intercultural business communication necessary for global
success. Using the Renault-Nissan Alliance as an example, the authors
argue that an appropriate metaphor can help provide the global glue
which captures the essence of the organisation’s activities, encapsulates
its strategic intent, incorporates the national and global cultures, and
portrays its ethical and business stance. Indeed, as is the case in the
Renault-Nissan Alliance, the appropriate use of metaphor allowed the
firm to bind a diverse group of stakeholders to a common goal by using
the inherent ambiguity and multiplicity of meaning of the metaphor to
overcome Asian and Western intercultural diﬀerences and at the same
time maximise goal congruence.
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Introduction
Over the last decade, research on strategic alliances has received increased
attention in the literature. Several streams can be identified: the first
dominant theme involves examining the underlying conditions favour-
ing alliance formation (Williamson 1991; Garcia-Pont and Nohria 2002);
the second deals with investigating the alliance outcomes and the impact
of alliances on the original partner firms (Kogut 1989; Doz 1996; Judge
and Dooley 2006); while the third explores issues relating to alliance dy-
namics (Singh and Mitchell 1996; Ireland, Hitt, and Vaidyanath 2002;
Das and Teng 2002). Concurrently, a wide body of literature discusses
the diﬃculties experienced by cross-national alliances. Findings also in-
dicate that many international strategic alliances are either abandoned or
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taken over by one of the partners a few years after their start up (Kumar
and Andersen 2000).
To date the literature on international strategic alliances indicates that
the critical factors facing an alliance performance and success are: the
development of shared values and norms among culturally divergent al-
liance partners (Lyles and Salk 1996; Kumar and Andersen 2000); the
importance of managing relations between the people of the alliances in
the early implementation stages (Doz andHamel 1998; Kelly, Schaan, and
Jonkas 2000); and finally establishing a trust-based relationship (Kok
and Wildeman 1999; Nielsen 2001). Inter-partner diversity (Parkhe 1991;
Adler and Graham 1989; Das and Teng 2002), culture clashes and associ-
ated language diﬀerences are frequently cited as the most common rea-
sons for alliance problems and failure (Child and Faulkner 1998; Kelly,
Schaan, and Jonkas 2000).
As global corporations mature, cross-cultural issues can become quite
confusing (Pooler 1992). Global strategic alliance management skills,
built through experience, become a core organisational competency.
This type of advantage at a time when mergers, joint ventures, and al-
liances are a prerequisite for global competitiveness and eﬀectiveness,
will launch a select few organisations into the elite realms of global lead-
ership (Quill 2000). Cultural dissimilarities when managed eﬃciently
and creatively will enhance innovation and dynamism leading to better
group performance (Cox 1993; Jehn and Bezrukova 2004).
Intercultural Business Communication
Research on the relative importance of national context and organisa-
tional characteristics highlights two divergent perspectives. The first be-
lieves that organisations are ‘culture free’ (Kerr et al. 1960; Mouton and
Blake 1970; Eisenstadt 1973; Prentice 1990). It argues that competitive
forces in the form ofmarkets, industrialisation and new technology over-
ride diﬀerences in a national context (Pugh et al. 1968; Child 1973; Eng-
land, Negandhi, and Wilpert 1979). The contrasting view contends that
organisations are in fact ‘culture bound’ (Dore 1973; Maurice, Arndt, and
Warner 1980). It argues that national contextual factors definitively deter-
mine management practice (Crozier 1964; Adler and Ghadar 1990; Hof-
stede 2001). However, while a large number of researchers have looked at
cultural variables that aﬀect intercultural business, the emphasis is typi-
cally not on the intercultural business communication process or linguis-
tic issues but instead on cultural attitudes (Haire, Ghiselli, and Porter
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1963; Laurent 1983; Hofstede 2001; Trompenaars and Woolliams 2003).
Studies in intercultural competence and cross-cultural communica-
tion in mncs have increased in the last 20 years (Beamer 1992; Chen and
Starosta 1998; Piekkari and Zander 2005). In the business literature, na-
tional diﬀerences are often cited as the source of intercultural commu-
nication conflicts and breakdowns arising between headquarters and lo-
cal site staﬀ. Intercultural business literature tends to focus on miscom-
munication or diﬀerences in discourse conventions often attributed to
cultural attitudes and variables (Hofstede 2001). While a large number
of researchers have looked at cultural variables that aﬀect intercultural
business, the emphasis is typically not on the intercultural business com-
munication process or linguistic issues but instead on cultural attitudes.
Varner (2000) in setting out an intercultural business communication
theoretical framework drew a clear diﬀerentiation between intercultural
communication and international business communication. She defines
intercultural business communication as a unique construct, which aims
to include business as a distinct variable, therefore diﬀerentiating it from
other intercultural communication processes. She argues that business –
such as an organisation or a business activity – must be an essential vari-
able of the communication hypothesis in so far as intercultural business
communication includes business strategies, goals, objectives and prac-
tices that form an essential part of the communication process and help
create a new environment out of the synergy of culture, communication
and business.
Metaphor, Organisations and Strategy
The use of metaphors in business communications can be viewed from a
number of perspectives. For the purposes of this section, the literature is
divided into three main areas: firstly, the role and purpose of metaphors
from a linguistic perspective, secondly the use of metaphors in organisa-
tional change, and finally the use of metaphor in competitive strategy.
metaphor: a linguistic perspective
A metaphor oﬀers patterns of interrelationships, which are normally
nonexistent: that is, a creative metaphor is a novel and original way of
building a bridge between two diﬀerent, usually separate, apparently
anomalous conceptual domains. If examined closely, they usually ex-
press a logical inconsistency, incongruence or a contradiction (Black
1962; MacCormac 1985; Morgan 1986; Ortony 1979). It is the contradic-
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tions within the metaphor, which increase its value in communicating
new concepts, new visions and motivating innovation and new product
development.
Since the Lakoﬀ and Johnson study (1980), metaphors are no longer
viewed as Socratic verbal ornamentation, a system of stylistic strategy
used to embellish speech. Linguists now believe that metaphors ‘actually
mirrored the cognitive processes that underlie abstract concepts’ (Danesi
and Perron 1999, 164). Johnson and Lakoﬀ argue that abstract percep-
tions are derived from a systematic ingestion of concrete perceptions
through metaphorical reasoning or mapping, and rename the output of
this process as conceptual metaphors. They traced the source of concep-
tual metaphors to image schemas (mental orientation; ontological think-
ing and the third one, a mixture of the aforementioned two schemas),
which are defined as culture bound. A conceptual metaphor is the prod-
uct of a cultural groupthink. It produces a process of cumulative cultural
models of ideas and provides the ‘conceptual glue’ that keep a system of
culture together with a view to creating another one (Danesi and Perron
1999).
metaphor and organisational change
Metaphors and metaphorical analysis are not solely used in linguistic
and literary studies, but have formed for the last few decades an im-
portant part of business and social science literature. The value of us-
ing metaphors and metaphorical language has been quickly recognised
by business analysts and strategists as a way to provide valuable insights
into organisations. Though there still exists a continuum of conflicting
views about its use, purpose and interpretation (Palmer and Dunford
1996; Cornelissen, Kafouros, and Lock 2005), the impact of metaphor
use in business studies has today firmly established itself.
In organisational change settings, a metaphor is a straightforward
method used to simplify the complex description of an organisation. It
can be used to perform a variety of analyses within the organisation such
as ‘decision-making, leadership, organisation development, policy, strat-
egy, information technology, organisational culture, organisation design
and production management’ (Palmer and Dunford 1996). Overall it is
used as a means to describe, convey large amounts of information and
understand organisational practices and problems (Palmer and Dunford
1996). As table 1 indicates, the range of metaphors used for organisational
change has been impressive if at times perplexing.
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table 1 Metaphors in organisational change
Machine and organisms Morgan 1980
Cultures, political systems, brains and psychic prisons Morgan 1986
Jazz bands and missionaries Akin and Schultheiss 1990
Clouds and songs Gergen 1992
Soap bubbles Tsoukas 1993
Strategic termites and Spider plants Morgan 1993
Adapted from Palmer and Dunford (1996).
metaphor and competitive strategy
Hunt andMenon (1995) argue that the four most commonly used frame-
works in the competitive strategy literature are all based on metaphors.
They highlight the evolutionary market/firm, game theoretic, strategic
alliance and marketing warfare frameworks as the dominant examples
of the use of metaphors in the strategy literature. They go on to explore
the dimensions of metaphoric transfer for the four principle competitive
strategy metaphors as outlined in table 2.
For management researchers, competitive strategy metaphors use lan-
guage to convey information and ideas, which can be transferred into
tacit knowledge, a way of thinking and viewing the world, which can-
not be easily articulated (Morgan 1986). In essence, a metaphor captures
the deficiency of the incapability to convey discrete symbol systems (lan-
guage) about an object, event or experience.
In dealing with cross-cultural communication in an international con-
text with multiple stakeholders, a strategic metaphor helps to achieve
uniformity of purpose and development of emotional links with a global
organisation. A strategic metaphor is a linguistic construction of care-
fully chosen words, which conveys the essence of the organisation’s
strategic intent and its core values. Due to the diﬀerent cognitive per-
spectives of stakeholders to an organisation, they take the same or diﬀer-
ent meanings from the strategic metaphor.
Metaphor and Communication
A metaphor is nonetheless a means of communication in so far as its
purpose is to convey a series of messages through a process of associa-
tion and images. As a process enabling the connection of diﬀerent cul-
tures, it is an ideal way to communicate and bond all stakeholders in
an alliance or joint venture regardless of their national or organisational
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table 2 Dimensions of metaphoric transfer
Metaphor Source Ontology Concepts Theories Values
War Military
science
Nations, armies,
divisions bat-
talions, non-
combatants,
combatants,
allies, military
academies
Strategy, tac-
tics, missions,
intelligence
deployment,
action diplo-
macy, echelon,
fortification,
espionage, pre-
emption rules
and level of war,
mobilization
Theory of
absolute
war, theory
of cold war,
voluntary
theory,
Douhet
theory of
war
Victory,
defense,
retaliation,
honor, duty
to country,
territory,
conquest,
economic
gain
Game Sports Teams, players,
fans, coaches,
trainers, writers,
commentators,
referees, scores,
audience, book-
ies, sponsors,
leagues champi-
onship
Oﬀense, de-
fense, cooper-
ation, team-
spirit, score
Zero-sum
game the-
ory, finite
game the-
ory, infi-
nite game
theory,
prisoner’s
dilemma
Sponsorship,
gamesman-
ship, com-
petition,
exercise,
pleasure,
relaxation,
release of
energy,
physical
fitness
Organism Biology Cells, humans,
plants, animals,
ecosystem,
genes
Life-cycle,
growth, adapta-
tion, nutrition,
niche, environ-
ment, resources,
progress
Evolutiona-
ry theory,
natural
selection,
adaptation
theory
Life,
growth,
survival
Marriage Sociology,
home eco-
nomics
Spouses, fam-
ily, household
children, or-
phans, relatives,
step-relatives,
father, mother,
sister, brother,
neighbors, mar-
riage, marriage
counselors
Kinship, rela-
tionship trust,
reproduction,
partners, di-
vorce, extra-
marital aﬀairs,
alimony, child
support
Marital
theory
Commit-
ment, love,
harmony,
financial
security,
protection
Adapted from Hunt and Menon (1995).
cultures. It provides a common language and a basis for communication
within the organisation.Through metaphor, an organisation can develop
a common language to express a common vision and strategy. It is a very
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eﬀective tool to engage multi-cultural teams and mono-cultural teams
operating in diﬀerent cultural contexts, building up cross-cultural teams
(Gibson and Zellmer-Bruhn 2002). The higher the power distance, the
more likely teamwork metaphors will be used (Gibson 2001).
Most strategists consider metaphorical language to be greater than lit-
eral language (Srivasta and Barrett 1988) because it can capture all organ-
isational stakeholders’ experience and emotions better and can ‘commu-
nicate meaning in complex, ambiguous situations where literal language
is inadequate’ (Palmer and Dunford 1996, 694). In business communi-
cation, metaphors are mostly used to introduce the concept of change,
and metaphorical discourse is to be found mainly in strategy change lit-
erature. In this context the use of a metaphor is usually considered as an
act of ‘pure creativity’ since its primary function is to stimulate the cre-
ative process and use one’s imagination to ‘evoke and suggest new ways
of doing things’ (Cleary and Packard 1992; Palmer and Dunford 1996).
They become a valuable communication tool to share concepts and vi-
sions and redirect both internal and external communication of purpose.
Whatever the nature of the metaphors, they are continuously referenced
to, and language driven by them is continuously used in the organisa-
tion to direct problem formulation and solution processes (Boland and
Greenberg 1988).
A commitment to addressing cross-cultural and intercultural issues
through changes in structures and processes significantly increases the
likelihood of success, a sustainable competitive success and facilitates
competitive agility in the global arena. An essential element for success
in an alliance, a joint venture or an mnc intercultural communication
strategy is to develop a strategic metaphor. This provides the global glue,
which captures the essence of the organisation’s activities, encapsulates
its strategic intent, the national and global cultures, and portrays its eth-
ical and business stance. The chief strategist as part of the intercultural
business communication process to all stakeholders uses the strategic
metaphor to bind the activities of the mnc and aim for global success.
Each stakeholder can take the same or diﬀerent meaning from a strategic
metaphor since its purpose is to stir diﬀerent personal emotions from
various stakeholders, be they shareholders or employees.
The Case Study
To be a global competitor in the car manufacturing industry, companies
need a strong geographic market presence in all continents. Today six car
manufacturers – General Motors, Ford, Toyota, Renault-Nissan, Volk-
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swagen and Daimler – have achieved suﬃcient critical mass to separate
them from the remaining volumemanufacturers. When Renault first ap-
proached Nissan, it was naturally seeking to acquire a global dimension,
which would allow the company not only to promote its products and its
business values, but also to secure greater profits for its shareholders.
Renault had already experienced a very traumatic divorce with Volvo
in 1993, subsequent to political and legal unrest in France. The progres-
sive wear and tear of that relationship had left Renault with a bitter-
sweet taste and a fear of ‘remarrying’. Once bitten, twice shy, Renault
courted Nissan with a very diﬀerent approach. Nissan was and is con-
sidered a symbol of Japanese society and culture in the same manner as
most French people equate Renault with their sense of Frenchness. There-
fore, the challenge faced by both companies was to reassess not only their
own internal (organisational culture) environments but equally, to re-
assess their own external (national culture) environments while keeping
communication channels opened both at local and international levels.
the pre-alliance process
Korine, Asakawa, and Gomez (2002), following an in-depth study of the
formation process of the alliance, identified four stages: the conceiving,
courting, commitment and closures phases. The initial conceiving phase
strictly involved the two ceos alone and was designed to develop trust
and mutual respect at the highest levels within the two firms. Only after
this trust and understanding had been established did the firms move to
the more formal courting stage. As part of this phase in July 1998, Nis-
san and Renault embarked on a set of talks, with approximately 200 staﬀ
members conducting joint team studies for several months to explore the
possibilities of complementing each other and creating potential syner-
gies by sharing critical information on each other’s strengths and best
practices. The results of their findings revealed that an alliance between
the two companies could have a positive outcome for both parties. These
joint team studies showed that Renault would be the best partner for
Nissan for building a mutually beneficial, complementary relationship in
terms of regional business activities and for obtaining a variety of cross-
cultural synergies. The intention was to promote collaborative ventures,
not through a mere merger or business tie-up, but through a new ap-
proach to a corporate alliance.
It was decided at the onset that the corporate alliance, would rely on a
strategy based primarily on trust and equity of participation, the imple-
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mentation of which came through the exchange and deep involvement
of middle management executives in the alliance process. Early in the
pre-stage negotiations, Renault had identified in Nissan similar working
values and similar business ethics. Nissan is viewed in Japan as a strong
symbol for the working class economy while Renault itself, in France,
epitomised the history of a working class taking pride in valuing not
only the work of its employees but the men who produced that work.
Though Renault acknowledges that this joint-venture was initially a cap-
ital transaction (it made a substantial financial commitment to Nissan),
it also recognises that their alliance must be based on a partnership be-
tween two diﬀerent corporate identities, representing strong brands and
very attached to the mutual development of their own company.
governance and structure of the alliance
As part of the commitment phase the two firms began to put in place
structures and processes to allow them to operationalize the principles
of the alliance. Renault-Nissan set up a Global Alliance Committee, co-
chaired by the ceo of Renault and the Chairman of Nissan, plus ten other
top executives (made of an equal number). It was agreed that, this com-
mittee should meet at least once a month, alternatively in Paris or Tokyo.
Their task was primarily to drive the main strategic orientations of the
alliance and aims for a merger of all cultural synergies, which could only
benefit the alliance. To ensure success at a micro level, Renault-Nissan
agreed to set up a joint co-ordination Bureau, responsible for the co-
ordinating and implementation of the decisions taken by the Global Al-
liance Committee. At the operating level, they appointed several cross
companies teams – with equal input – for each geographical zone, which
aimed to implement actions such as research and development, supplier
relations, productions platforms and powertrain families, distribution
and financing of sales. A third and final committee – functional task
team – was created. Its function was to support quality, cost control,
scheduling, market analysis, human resources, tax implications and le-
gal resources. The cross companies’ teammembers were also responsible
for analysing non-operational eﬀects on the development of the group
and the harmonisation of standards and practices.
In addition, the number of board members was reduced, and a new
system for the appointment of ‘corporate oﬃcers’ was introduced to dis-
tinguish management decision-making and execution of operations. To
strengthen Nissan’s management, a Renault Executive Vice President,
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Co-ordination Bureau
Renault Nissan
Cross company teams
Functional task teams
figure 1 Management structures and governance of the alliance
was appointed Chief Operating Oﬃcer and became a member of the
Board of Directors of Nissan. As part of its new management system,
Nissan received another two executives from Renault. Nissan reduced the
number of members on its Board of Directors from thirty-seven to ten
as part of its eﬀort to improve management eﬃciency.
It was also agreed that Renault would send thirty Renault executives
on assignment with Nissan and appoint the chairman of Nissan to the
Renault Board of Directors. Once, this was concluded, both compa-
nies were left to face their first real challenge, that is implementing all
the above conceptual partnership structures at an operational level. The
challenge was to put into practice the above strategies while safeguard-
ing the cultural ethos of both companies and to improve intercultural
communication.
Followingmore discussions, it was decided that partnership structures
should adhere to the following principles:
• they should be simple and understandable by both companies;
• they should be transnational;
• they should facilitate confidence and transparency;
• they should be based on the spirit of a win-win scenario;
• no party should be favoured or disadvantaged;
• no party should lose its cultural identities and/or brand;
• continuous dialogues and communication, despite geographical
distance, should be encouraged to promote a spirit of partnership
at all times.
It was not until at a very advanced stage in the formation of the al-
liance that formal contractual positions began to be addressed. Instead
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the two main focuses during these four phases remained the same at all
times: both ceos put the alliance process itself at the centre of their re-
spective strategies and both ceos used the process of the alliance as an
opportunity to initiate strategic changes within their firms prior to the
signing of the agreement. Korine, Asakawa, and Gomez (2002) point out
that both ceos took a long-term view on the alliance project, not only
to secure its viability but also to ensure that they could deliver. They fur-
ther indicate that for the majority of strategic alliances organisational
commitment and identification based-trust need to be established (2002,
49). It is with this in mind that Renault and Nissan saw in the alliance
formation an opportunity to launch change within their own organisa-
tional structures, review Nissan’s problems and the occasion to build up
Renault’s profile in the automotive world. Korine, Asakawa, and Gomez
(2002) identified three steps both companies had to undertake to give
birth to the alliance: build up a deep knowledge of each other through
the formation of the joint team studies; break down Nissan’s resistance
to change; and infuse entrepreneurial spirit into Nissan by implementing
new management structures and developing new strategic views.
The set up of the Global Alliance Committee and the use of joint team
studies prior to the signing up of the agreement allowed the establish-
ment of a common language and protocol. Everything appeared to be
very positive and well planned. However, one of the main problems, as
identified by both companies at the time of negotiations, remained not
only the cultural confrontation of two organisational cultures but also
the cultural confrontation of their employees. The question became how
to sustain this beautiful marriage and avoid cultural war?
The Renault-Nissan AllianceMetaphor
Both companies had to transcend their own national culture and stereo-
types to reach what Airaudi (consultant for Renault and specialist on
Japan) refers to as the ‘conquest of the inner frontier’. As a result, both
parties could then appreciate and assess what was needed to change two
such complex organisations. In other words, Renault recognised that the
success of the adventure did not solely depend on the economical and
legal aspect of the venture, but it had to succeed at a more human, quasi-
anthropological level (Housson 2000).
Communication diﬃculties arose not only because of there being two
diﬀerent languages in use (two diﬀerent systems and registers of lan-
guages) but more importantly because conceptual frameworks, favoured
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by the French, are not easily accepted by the Japanese since ideograms
already represent a visual and concrete concept in the Japanese written
language (Housson 2000). Cartesian semantics clashed with the subtle
ambiguities of Japanese communication processes and the complexities
of silence and its cultural interpretations in various negotiation and so-
cial contexts. From an organisational point of view, both the French and
the Japanese are fundamentally opposed on the question of an essential
cultural ideology: the role itself of the company. The western ideolog-
ical quest for value added, turnover, and increasing profit is not at the
heart of the Japanese organisational philosophy. In Japan, an organisa-
tion’s purpose is to reinvest whatever and however small the profit is in
the company. Its raison d’être is to survive, that is to reinvest itself within
itself on a continuous basis.
Since the early days, both companies recognised and worked on the
assumption that the national cultural aspects of the two partners were
profoundly diﬀerent. Both companies understood that they both feared
the usual cultural clichés of French idiosyncrasies (arrogance, individu-
alism, egocentrism, intellectual pretentiousness, anarchismmanagement
style, inability to follow instructions, allergy to authority etc.); while on
the other hand Renault’s employees were equally challenged by the same
subconscious prejudices of their Japanese counterparts (insularity, fear
of invasion, unilateral mindset, fear of conceptualising etc.). To over-
come this cultural challenge, it called upon a team of consultant psychol-
ogists, who advised them to acknowledge and accept the friction arising
out of such negative emotions without censoring them. Both parties un-
dertook to reach this inner frontier without attempting to colonise the
other culture and instead identify the aﬃnities or positive singularities
of the other party, that is to acquire a sense of self and subsequently a
sense of the other.
A key element in achieving this goal was the importance paid to lan-
guage, linguistic and cultural issues but more specifically the use of
metaphor to create the emotional climate for success. Two specific ex-
amples of the use of metaphor stand out. The first of these, the strategic
metaphor, ‘The Renault-Nissan Alliance’ was designed to ensure that the
transaction was to be a marriage of equals (a true partnership) while the
second ‘Renault Créateur d’Automobiles’ (a marketing metaphor) was
primarily concerned with highlighting the synergies, which the alliance
would subsequently bring to the parties.
From a purely financial and legal perspective the Renault-Nissan
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figure 2 Analysis of the metaphor Renault-Nissan alliance
agreement eﬀectively gave Renault a controlling interest in Nissan. The
size of the initial shareholding acquired (36.8%) and the subsequent
rise to 44.4% make Renault the dominant shareholder in Nissan for the
foreseeable future. From a strictly accounting perspective the new firm
Renault-Nissan bv amounts to an eﬀective takeover of Nissan by Re-
nault. Despite these realities Renault has continued to place enormous
importance on portraying the transaction as an alliance. A key part of
this portrayal is the firm’s insistence on continuing to use the ‘Renault-
Nissan Alliance’ metaphor.
‘Renault-Nissan Alliance’ is a conceptual metaphor. The first point to
notice is the use of the dash between the words Renault and Nissan,
which is used to portray both organisations as a single and united en-
tity. Consider an ontological analysis of the word alliance. In the western
world, the connotations of the word alliance are: a marriage, the union
of two persons based on a legal relationship. In French, it also signifies
a wedding ring. In military terms, it implies the agreement of two par-
ties joining their respective eﬀorts to face a common enemy, present-
ing a united front to win against the opposition, the enemy. In business
terms, it stands for a partnership based on trust, equality and equity.
In religious terms, it refers to the pact concluded between God and the
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Hebrew people and in rhetoric, it refers to the meeting of two diﬀerent
group concepts. At the other end of the spectrum, we must also look at
the temporary connotations associated with the word alliance such as,
marriages end in divorce, military alliances end, partnerships fail.
Now consider a mapping of the words: Renault-Nissan. The conno-
tations associated with Renault-Nissan are two competing car manufac-
turers for a share in the Asian market, competition between the Euro-
pean market and the Asian market. It juxtaposes two diﬀerent cultures,
the West and the East, French and Japanese. It stands to represent the
strengths of each party involved, that is creative design and engineering
innovativeness.
To support and encourage this process, the alliance raised the notion
of a global citizenship, which purports to complement the respective
identities of all parties involved. To realise this notion of a global citi-
zenship, they drafted an Alliance Charter, the purpose of which is to be
used as a symbol and rallying point for all the citizens of the alliance tau-
tology. To overcome cross-cultural challenges, conflicting perspectives,
national cultures prior to the Alliance, reinforce the concept of an al-
liance and subsequently maximise communication post the alliance, a
strategic metaphor was developed. Alongside this concrete statement of
intent was the decision to adopt English as the lingua franca of the new
organisation.
promoting intercultural communications
and cooperation
Despite significant restructuring, both companies actively promoted in-
tercultural communication firstly through personnel exchanges and sec-
ondly through the Alliance Business Way Program. Personnel exchanges
fell into four categories: namely Renault and Nissan expatriates em-
ployed by the company during their expatriation; alliance projects such
as engines and transmissions and RandD; employees exchanged within
a regional framework, where for example Renault employees have been
assigned to European Nissan aﬃliates.
The importance of the Alliance Business Way Program cannot be un-
derestimated in terms of promoting a performance-oriented culture, and
should be regarded as a concrete measure to support intercultural com-
munication and as amechanism to support the values of the Alliance and
of the strategic metaphor. The programme has two strands. The first con-
centrates on cross-cultural training to understand cultural backgrounds
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and working styles, consisting of a number of conferences with the theme
of ‘Working with Japanese/French Partners’. The focus of the conferences
is centred on communications, project management and how to over-
come resistance and problems while maintaining a positive partnership
and pursue a common objective. The second is a series of Team Work-
ing Seminars, focusing on team and individual eﬃciencies by developing
team’s processes and enhancing team communication.
structures and governance
The Alliance Charter and the communication of the Alliance metaphor
significantly aided Goshn’s revival plan for Nissan. In terms of the Al-
liance structures, over 350 personnel drawn from both companies are
involved in management and governance structures of the Alliance. Its
management structure consists of an Alliance board responsible for de-
veloping the long-term strategy and initiating global joint activities. The
next level consists of a Co-ordination Bureau based in Paris and Tokyo,
coordinating the work of Cross Company Teams and Functional Task
Teams (see figure 1). This management and governance structure rein-
forces the Alliance Charter principles and values. Such a structure not
only formalises the Alliance, but culturally signals the importance of
cross learning, mutual respect and maintains the balance between both
parties. In essence the structure supports the view that the Alliance is the
construction of a group with dual nationality not a merger. As Douin
(2002, 3) commented: ‘This meant establishing a subtle balance between
two companies. This balance was guaranteed by the Alliance charter,
which is a symbol of support for values which are held in common such
as ambition and the desire to succeed, performance, mutual trust and
respect, balance and loyalty.’ Essentially, by focusing on common even
universal values, the Alliance begins the process of becoming culturally
free (Kerr et al. 1960; Mouton and Blake 1970; Eisenstadt 1973; Prentice
1990). Therefore, over time, management practices throughout organi-
sations becomemore alike, bound by common values, irrespective of the
national context. Using personnel exchanges and the Alliance Business
Way Program assists in the development of intercultural communica-
tions, but over time also means that the focus for both parties will be
on their common values and a culture that is performance orientated,
which ultimately binds every person in the organisation at personal level
and personalises risk and reward for every employee irrespective of na-
tionality.
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Discussion
Conflicting national and organisational cultures are blamed for the fail-
ure of international alliances. However, the Renault-Nissan experience
provides strong evidence that where these diﬀerences are explicitly recog-
nised and accepted, and where appropriate processes and structures are
put in place, national and organisational culture obstacles can be sur-
mounted. The harmonisation of culture, which Turnheim (1996) speaks
of, can be accomplished in the form of structures, policies and practices.
This harmonisation of cultures ought to take place through a process
of cross-cultural communication, in the early implementation stages, to
maintain a competitive advantage based on organisational culture. The
Alliance Charter drawn up between Nissan and Renault gives a structure
as to how this harmonisation can be achieved, building on trust, truth,
human respect, business ethics, confidentiality, and fairness to ensure
balance between both parties.
Reconciliation of cultural diﬀerences can be approached in a number
of diﬀerent ways. The most common one is to adopt one partner’s cul-
ture as dominant. The other alternative is to separate or limit the activi-
ties of the partners so as to minimise cultural interaction and hence the
likelihood of cultural clashes. These not only limit the prospect of cul-
tural conflicts but also reduce the potential of the partners learning and
benefiting from each other’s culture and business experience. The most
integrative approach remains to face up to, manage cultural diﬀerences
by involving partners at all levels, and participate in cross-cultural de-
velopment programs. More recent research has claimed that it is not the
initial cultural clashes per se that create problems, but people’s divergent
beliefs and values of the organisation which give rise to problematic situ-
ations. They maintain that a strong adopted integration strategy should
be culturally compatible and that it is the acculturation processes that
managers should turn their attention to with a view to either assimilate,
integrate, separate or ‘deculturise’ (Vaara 2000).
Eﬀective cross-cultural communication combined with managerial
pluralism and the acceptance of substance over form in the design of or-
ganisational structures (in particular the senior management team) are
prerequisites for success in bringing together two organisational cultures.
Strong and eﬃcient cultures which Christensen and Gordon (1999) de-
scribed, are typically characteristic of Japanese firms such as Nissan Mo-
tor Co. Renault culture is also very eﬃcient, but both companies are used
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to diﬀerent management styles. They both needed to be aware that a suc-
cessful enterprise would only grow if they acknowledged and respected
each other’s respective cultures and were committed to co-operating and
working closely together. In establishing the Global Alliance Commit-
tee and the cross-cultural teams, it appears that senior management was
aiming for an ‘insiderisation’ approach to managing the new partner-
ship. Their aims were to motivate and develop a shared vision with an
emphasis on team building, restoring the self-esteem of both companies
with the intention of raising their visibility and credibility on the inter-
national automotive trade scene. This pragmatic approach to cultural
issues convinced both partners to reassure their workforce by cultivating
the employees’ sense of the métier (trade), thereby creating a sense of
pride and participation in the new epic venture.
Cohabitation not colonisation is the eﬀective long-run model for ex-
ploiting the Alliance. This in turn requires a high degree of transcultur-
ality and the creation of a new corporate citizenship, the birth of a new
nomadic brain. Trompenaars (1998) believes culture is the way in which
a group of people solves problems. Again, the Alliance Charter cites trust
as the building block towards joint problem solving. Academics and re-
searchers must urgently address the poverty of the informing conceptual
frameworks that guide management in creating post-alliance organisa-
tions. In particular, there is a need for more longitudinal field-based re-
search to provide theoretical insights into the true nature of international
alliances and in particular to improve our understanding of the dynamic
of what are often colliding national and organisational cultures. It is only
with these practical and theoretical insights that architects for change can
achieve true cross-cultural fluency and create the emotional climate for
communication and co-operation.
As organisations and industries become more knowledge-intensive
there is a growing need to recognise that it is intangible assets, resources
in the form of ideas, brands, innovation etc., which are the source of
long-term competitive advantage. International alliances which fail to
retain and nurture the knowledge and human capital of the post-merger
organisation will not achieve success in the long-term. In the modern
organisation of the 21st century, the marauding conqueror view of global
expansion must give way to more enlightened ideas such as the meeting
of minds and shared meaning that characterise the learning organisa-
tion. Comparative advantage in the long run will come not from capital,
products or even superior manufacturing and marketing processes, but
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from the ability to master and manage the continuous stream of cross-
cultural challenges which globalisation brings with it.
In order to cope with the complex international environment pres-
sures, Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) stressed the importance of develop-
ing not one strategy (transnational, albeit multidimensional), and urged
organisations to commit to a global, multinational and international
strategy simultaneously. They must become, in Bartlett and Ghoshal’s
words, a transnational company. Again, the Global Alliance Committee
and cross-cultural teams reflect this thinking, concentrating on estab-
lishing an integrated networking structure, committed decision-making
and highly innovative capabilities.
Metaphors are often used in the language of business to maximise ef-
fect and delivery. The purpose of a metaphor is to view one thing in
terms of or as a substitute for another. Its concepts are crucial to uncover
or trigger latent needs and emotions. Methapor is often used to iden-
tify a belief of value or a value system within which people can operate.
In that sense it requires a cognitive function. A strategic metaphor pro-
vides the strategist with words to shed light on his /her cognitive function
which outlines simplicity of purpose and creates a platform to address
competing needs. The strategic metaphor encapsulates the strategic in-
tent of the organisation, its competitive position in the market, its core
competencies, and its approach to business ethics and in dealing with
society as a whole. Furthermore, it reinforces a culture of success, by at-
tempting to create a personal emotional connection with key stakehold-
ers such as employees, investors and customers. Moreover, stakeholders
take their own interpretation from the strategic metaphor thus satisfying
their needs. In an international alliance the strategist can use the diﬀer-
ent interpretations to communicate the positive aspects of the alliance to
all stakeholders, while maintaining some degree of freedom to pursue all
strategic paths to ensure the success of the alliance.
In seeking to understand the Renault-Nissan’s use of metaphor, it
is important to note that it can be argued that the deployment of
metaphorical language in its stead ignores the fact that people may inter-
pret it from heterogeneous cultural and conceptual backgrounds. Fluid
it may be for the ‘national culture’, but alien it may be to another. A sim-
ple illustration of this point is ‘Snow-white corporate ethics’ could have
many interpretations – overt honesty, ethics can melt over time, white
can turn to grey very quickly when convenient, snow is malleable etc.
However, the subtleties are likely to be lost on an Indian, a Nigerian, a
New Caledonian who have never seen snow. In addition, issues of trans-
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lation may also raise concerns about the applicability of the metaphor.
The question that arises is does this lack of uniformity not cause a prob-
lem? A strategy that can be this easily manipulated by heterogeneous
groups may be seen as being fundamentally flawed the ‘global glue’
might be of no more use than sellotape. As such it could be argued
that a metaphor, which attempts to involve all the cultures in an alliance,
a joint venture, an mnc, might be overly optimistic?
Quills (2000) argues that cultural diﬀerences ought to be viewed as
opportunities to achieve synergy and to enhance eﬀectiveness, not as ob-
stacles to overcome. To create a synergistic organisation, that values and
uses diﬀerence, management must employ an intercultural communica-
tion framework and develop an organisational intercultural competency.
A strategic metaphor can help towards achieving this goal. Today, Nis-
san and Renault are equally aware that, while both companies are com-
ing from very diﬀerent backgrounds, they must remain enthusiastic and
willing to work through their cultural diﬀerences – the Charter alone is
evidence of this dedication. As outlined earlier, the reality of the transac-
tion between the two firms was an eﬀective acquisition of a controlling
interest by Renault in Nissan. From the outset, however, senior man-
agement in both firms were prepared to set aside that reality and instead
move forward on the basis of an alliance of equals based on acceptance of
their diﬀerences. The adoption of the ‘Alliance’ label for the transaction
was a powerful and lasting first step in creating the emotional and or-
ganisational climate for real partnership. While some would suggest that
the reality of Renault’s shareholding leaves it as the dominant partner in
the relationship, the use of the Alliance strategic metaphor has been an
important part of the successful deployment of processes, structures and
strategies that have allowed the important intercultural communication
to take place right from the beginning. While some commentators might
interpret the use of the ‘Alliance’ strategic metaphor as a cynical manip-
ulation designed to camouflage an underlying reality, the authors would
suggest that in fact the strategic metaphor has allowed the two firms to
avoid the pacman approach, to escape what was a potential fatal source
of cultural conflicts and create a new reality based on a partnership of
trust, respect and equals.
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